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Abstract
What can governments do to encourage nonprofit hospitals to provide greater benefits to their
communities? Recent efforts by the federal and state governments seek to hold hospitals accountable
for community health, in part by incentivizing charity care provision. Laws that set benchmarks for
charity care spending are increasingly used, but their efficacy is uncertain. In this study, we examine the
extent to which Illinois’ minimum charity care provision (MCCP) law increases nonprofit hospital
charity care. Importantly, we differentiate between responses for hospitals required to provide minimal
charitable spending (nonprofits) and those that are not (for-profit and public). We use detailed panel
(2009-2015) data from Illinois' Annual Hospital Questionnaire and county-level data from the
American Community Survey. We exploit a discrete change in charitable care requirements for
nonprofit hospitals to identify the effect of the MCCP law on charity care, controlling for hospital
characteristics, county demographics, and year and county (or hospital) fixed effects. Employing a
differences-in-differences model, we find no evidence that the MCCP law increases charity care on
average. Instead, we find some evidence that the law’s effects vary by how much charity care hospitals
provided previously – charity care increases for those providing lower levels at baseline, narrowing the
gap in charity care provision with those that provide high levels at baseline. The results suggest that
setting low benchmarks does not create sufficient incentives for nonprofit hospitals to provide greater
charity care on average, but instead may narrow the gap between high and low charity care hospitals.
JEL No.: I18, I11, H71
Keywords: Minimum Charity Provision Laws, Nonprofit Hospitals, Charity Care
Authors: Michah W. Rothbart, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public
Affairs, Syracuse University; Nara Yoon, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse
University

“Hospitals were built—mostly by churches—to be a safe haven for people regardless of one’s race, creed
or ability to pay. Hospitals have a nonprofit status—most of them—for a reason. They’re supposed to be
community institutions.”
-

Martin A. Makary, Professor of Surgery at Johns Hopkins Medicine, as quoted in McCambridge
(2019).

“You should get close to the value of tax exemption in community benefit. I think you’ll find most
hospitals aren’t providing that.”
-

Paula Song, Associate Professor of Health Policy and Management at the University of North
Carolina Gillings School of Global Public Health as quoted in Rosenthal (2013).

Introduction
What can governments do to hold nonprofit hospitals accountable for providing sufficient community
benefits? While for-profit and government hospitals are large players in the U.S. healthcare market,
approximately two-thirds of all hospitals are tax-exempt charitable organizations (American Hospital
Association Survey 2019) with privileged tax status – they do not pay property taxes, and in some cases,
sales taxes. 1 This expensive tax expenditure is potentially justified by community health benefits offered
by nonprofit hospitals, including charity care. Tax exemptions may help nonprofit hospitals support the
hospitals’ missions through the provision of charity care (Sutton and Stensland 2004; Thorpe and Phelps
1991). Governments and the public, therefore, increasingly seek to hold nonprofit hospitals accountable
for their communities’ health to justify their tax-exemption benefits.

1 Previous work estimates tax exemptions for charitable hospitals were $24.6 billion in 2011 (Rosenbaum et al. 2015).
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Recent policies, including the Affordable Care Act (ACA), attempt to provide nonprofit
hospitals with incentives to increase community benefits and to address broader community needs. 2 Tax
expenditures are an indirect government intervention intended to achieve public policy aspirations, but
they only circuitously hold nonprofit organizations accountable for provision of services such as
community health (see, for example, Musgrave and Musgrave 1980; Benjamin and Posner 2018;
Howard 2002; Kettl 2002). Others have argued that providing tax benefits serves as an “implicit
subsidy” (Sanders 1995) to nonprofit hospitals to support their public service missions, including charity
care – but the incentive is often just an implicit and not an explicit requirement.
Despite increasing attention to the theories of ownership and widespread use of federal and state
legislation to address broader community health needs, research on the extent to which governments can
encourage nonprofit hospitals to provide greater charity care is thin and mixed (Noble et al. 1998; Sutton
and Stensland 2004; Kennedy et al. 2010). To fill this gap, we evaluate Illinois’ minimum charity care
provision (MCCP) law to examine the conditions under which government policies can incentivize
nonprofit hospitals’ provision of charity care.
In 2012, Illinois “set the bar” for charity care spending at a level at least equal to the foregone
property tax levy for a nonprofit hospital. By “setting the bar,” the government codified a target that
nonprofit hospitals must meet or face consequences. The Illinois’ MCCP law raises fundamental
questions for researchers and policymakers about policy effectiveness. An adequate evaluation of this
type of policy will provide insights into whether a series of shifts in policies aimed at expanding nonprofit
hospitals’ community obligations will have their intended positive effect on community health. The

2 Tax-exempt hospitals spent an average of 7.5% of their expenditures on community benefits during the fiscal year 2009, of

which, more than 85% was spent on charity care, government payer payment shortfalls, and subsidized health services (Young
et al. 2013).
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effects may also have considerable consequences for equity, depending on which patients benefit from
these policies.
In this paper, we assess the extent to which Illinois’ MCCP law increases the provision of charity
care in nonprofit hospitals, comparing the effects of the law in nonprofit hospitals to hospitals not subject
to the requirements (for-profits and government). We provide evidence on the extent to which and
conditions under which government policies increase charity care provided in nonprofit hospitals. We
explore which hospitals increase charity care, presumably because they receive sufficient incentives to
further fulfill their missions. We use difference-in-differences models and longitudinal, hospital-level data
on general hospitals in Illinois (nonprofit, for-profit, and public) from 2009-2015 to estimate the impact
of Illinois’ MCCP law on charity care provided. Our sample is comprised of hospital data from Illinois’
Annual Hospital Questionnaire and county-level data from the American Community Survey, including
demographic, fiscal, and geographic information on 105 general hospitals with audited financial
statements. We focus on impacts for two key outcomes: (1) percentage of patients receiving charity
care, and (2) percentage of health services spent on charity care.
In brief, we find nonprofit and government hospitals provide more charity care than for-profit
hospitals before the MCCP policy. Impact estimates on the effects of the policy, however, show little
evidence that the MCCP law increases charity care provision. Instead, we find some evidence that the
law’s effects vary by how much charity care hospitals previously provided – charity care increases for
those providing lower levels at baseline, narrowing the gap in charity care provision with those that
provide high levels at baseline. These findings, taken together, provide new insights for the ongoing
debate on the effectiveness of government policies designed to incentivize hospitals’ provision of charity
care, and what makes for effective accountability policy for nonprofits more broadly.

3

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline the policy context,
including recent government activity intended to increase hospitals’ provision of charity care. In the third
section, we review relevant literature on the link between hospital ownership and charity care, and
government policies intended to encourage hospitals to be accountable for community health. In the
fourth section, we discuss our data and measures followed by a section outlining our empirical strategy.
Finally, we show results followed by comments and conclusions.

Policy Context: Regulatory Approaches to Hold Nonprofit Hospitals
Accountable for Charity Care
In the hospital sector, nonprofit hospitals play an outsize role and governments have begun to explore a
variety of policies intended to hold them accountable (Sanders 1993; Sutton and Stensland 2004; Noble
et al., 1998). Recent policy approaches, in the era of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), attempt to hold
nonprofit hospitals accountable for increased provision of community benefits and address broader
community needs. Although there is a wide range of activities that could be considered beneficial to a
community, previous studies have typically used “uncompensated care” and “charity care.” For instance,
“uncompensated care” includes charity care, bad debt, and shortfalls in government-sponsored care
(such as Medicare and Medicaid), while “charity care” refers to the unbilled expenditures for
disadvantaged patients when the determination to provide care free of charge is made before the medical
services are provided (see, for example, Thorpe and Phelps 1991; Herzlinger and Krasker 1987;
Nicholson et al. 2000).
Although myriad potential laws may increase and enforce community benefit standards, we
focus on the two most common policies – (1) reporting requirements, and (2) minimum charity care
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provision (MCCP) laws. Together, these two policy efforts are aimed at increasing accountability for taxexempt hospitals with respect to community benefit activities.
Laws with reporting requirements may compel hospitals to report the levels and types of
community benefits and charity care provided. 3 These policies provide positive signals for generous
hospitals that provide high levels of charity care or, alternatively, publicly shame those that do not. 4 We
call laws with reporting requirements “gold starring” policies. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2009 (ACA) has a few features consistent with gold starring policies. The ACA mandated public
reporting of community benefit activities to improve standardization and transparency.

5

One key

feature of these reporting requirements was the new Schedule H, which was added for hospitals in 2009
to supplement financial data collected from all tax-exempt organizations on the IRS Form 990. 6 In
addition to information on hospital activities, policies, and bad debt, the ACA also requires all nonprofit
hospitals in the U.S. (with over $50,000 in revenues) to report on community benefits, including charity
care, on the Schedule H each year. Failure to meet federal requirements may yield significant
disadvantages, ranging from an annual $50,000 excise tax to revocation of the hospital’s 501(c)(3) taxexempt status (IRS instructions 2015). The major categories of federal community benefit requirements
found in the ACA and the IRS, however, do not specify a minimum level of charity care that a hospital

Currently, 31 states require nonprofit hospitals to comply with community benefit reporting laws
(https://hilltopinstitute.org/our-work/hospital-community-benefit/hcbp-state-comparison/).
4 Similar policies that aim to encourage behavior through sharing information are common in other areas of regulation,
including food safety compliance (Jin and Leslie 2003, 2009; Rothbart et al. 2019) and education (Figlio and Lucas 2004;
Rockoff and Turner 2010).
5 Section 9007 of the ACA established “additional requirements for charitable hospitals” in the
new I.R.C. §501(r), which standardizes community benefit reporting for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt hospitals and establishes
specific requirements that these hospitals must meet as a condition of preserving their federal tax exemption. Further, the
ACA established new standards for community health needs assessment, financial assistance policies, and hospital charges,
billing, and collection practices.
6 IRS Schedule H data in tax year 2013 suggests that 11.7% of total spending in nonprofit hospitals goes to community
benefits including “free or discounted care, Medicaid underpayments, health research, education, bad debt expense
attributable to patients eligible for financial assistance, Medicare shortfalls, and other community benefits and building
activities” (AHA report, 2017).
3
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must provide in return for tax-exempt status. Ambiguity in federal standards for charity care may
partially explain limited and mixed research on the extent to which governments can influence the level
of the community benefits provided by nonprofit hospitals (Morrisey et al. 1996; Kennedy et al. 2010).
Conversely, Minimum Charity Care Provision (MCCP) laws 7 further regulate nonprofit hospitals
by imposing compliance criteria with a threat of eliminating tax exemption status. These policies “set the
bar,” requiring nonprofit hospitals to provide charity care at or above a set threshold (typically
determined by the size of foregone tax burden) in order to retain their tax exemptions. As of 2019, five
states have MCCP laws 8 (Illinois, Texas, Utah, Pennsylvania, Nevada), which are typically enforced by
threat of removal of tax exemptions. Illinois passed its MCCP law in 2012. There, hospitals can lose both
property tax and sales tax exemptions if they fail to comply with the MCCP requirements, providing a
very strong financial incentive. While privileged tax status can be thought of as a carrot for provision of
services that serve the public interest, removal of tax exemptions through a MCCP law might be a
powerful stick to incentivize behavior. 9 This study offers an empirical investigation of the impact of the
Illinois’ MCCP law on hospitals’ charity care provision.

7 Illinois Property Tax Code, S.B. 2194, codified at 35 ILCS 200/15-86(c)(2012).

The legal requirements for vary by state (https://hilltopinstitute.org/our-work/hospital-community-benefit/hcbp-statecomparison/).
9 Prior to the implementation of Illinois’ MCCP law, two hospitals, Riverside Medical Center and Provena Covenant Medical
Center, were threatened with loss of tax exemptions due to allegedly failing to offer sufficient benefit to the public interest.
The Illinois Department of Revenue revoked Provena Covenant Medical Center’s property tax-exemption status in 2004
because of alleged inadequacy of its charitable activity (Barniv et al. 2005; Provena Covenant Med. Cent. v. Dep. Rev. 236
III. 2d 368 (2010)). The lawsuits signaled to hospitals that they should take Illinois’ community benefits requirements
seriously and that the Department of Revenue might aggressively enforce future requirements. The MCCP law was a response
to Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in the Provena Covenant Medical Center case, setting a standardized and transparent
benchmark.
8
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Literature Review
In this paper, we build on previous research that examines the extent to which governments can hold
nonprofit hospitals accountable for provision of community benefits, focusing on the extent to which
MCCP policies increase charity care spending and exploring potential mechanisms. We investigate two
issues, including sectoral differences in the provision of hospital charity care and the role of government
policies to increase charity care, especially focusing on MCCP laws.
First, theories of sectoral difference are widely used to understand the relationship between
ownership and organizational performance in public administration research (Heinrich 2009; Herzlinger
and Krasker 1987; Bozeman and Bretschneider 1994; Rainey and Bozeman 2000; Perry and Rainey
1988). Although evidence suggests that sectoral difference is related to health service provisions in
markets where public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations compete (Amirkhanyan et al. 2008;
Amirkhanyan et al. 2017; Weisbrod and Schlesinger 1986; Johansen and Zhu 2013; Hansmann 1987;
Ben‐Ner and Van Hoomissen 1991), work is inconclusive on the relationship between hospital
ownership type and the level of charity care provided (or community benefits, more broadly) in the
absence of government incentives. For instance, some studies find that nonprofit hospitals provide
greater levels of community benefit and charity care than for-profit hospitals (Arrington and Haddock
1990; Clement et al. 2002). Others, however, find little evidence that nonprofit hospitals provide
community benefits and charity care at higher rates than for-profits (Schneider 2007; Schneider and
Yilmaz 2013; Bazzoli et al. 2010).
Second, public administration researchers have long tried to understand the role government
policy can play in shaping the accountability of the third-party actors in the nonprofit sector (Romzek
and Johnston 2005; Salamon 1995; Posner 2002; Bardach and Lesser 1996). There are a variety of tools
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available to public administrators to hold third parties accountable for the delivery of services that are in
the public interest (Dicke and Ott 1999; Johnston and Romzek 1999; Dubnick and Frederickson 2009;
Van Slyke 2006).
One such policy, charity care reporting policies, require hospitals to report levels of charitable
activities provided to the community. Research on the extent to which charity care reporting policies can
influence the size of the community benefits provided by nonprofit hospitals is thin and mixed. For
example, some studies find that nonprofit hospitals increase community benefits in response to the
reporting policy requirements (Young et al. 2013; Hellinger 2009; Gray and Schlesinger 2009; Ginn and
Moseley 2006), while other studies find that the policies do not significantly affect the provision of
community benefits (Schneider 2007; Bazzoli et al. 2010).
More relevant to our paper, other policies such as MCCP laws, set a target benchmark for the
provision of one particular community benefit, charity care. Two previous studies examine the
effectiveness of MCCP laws per se, both of which assess the law in Texas and neither of which find that
minimum thresholds increase charity care spending (Kennedy et al. 2010; Sutton and Stensland 2004).
Note, however, that these studies are limited because they do not have a counterfactual group to follow
over time. The samples in previous MCCP research include only nonprofit hospitals, which are all
required to comply with MCCP laws. A key limitation, therefore, is that their findings may merely indicate
sector changes over time. The pre-post designs might be biased by alternative contemporaneous changes
in policy that affect charity care provision.
The underlying assumption of Kennedy et al. (2010), for example, is that nonprofits that already
provide sufficient charity care are not subject to the MCCP law and keep charity care the same. This is,
however, an empirical question. Nonprofit hospitals may respond differently to the treatment if they
provide high levels of charity care prior to policy implementation, but they may well still be treated in
8

some way. Further complicating matters, it is unclear, a priori, which direction the bias may go. Previous
research on MCCP laws may under or overestimate the impacts of MCCP depending on whether
nonprofits already “above the bar” respond to the law by increasing, decreasing, or keeping charity care
the same. Including other, untreated hospitals, such as government and for-profits, would improve the
analysis by offering a counterfactual for comparison. Our study fills this gap by including hospitals with
all ownership types (nonprofit, for-profit, government) and comparing charity care provided by all three
ownership types over time.

Data and measures
To examine the effectiveness of Illinois’ MCCP laws, we merge hospital financial, size, and demographic
data from Illinois’ Annual Hospital Questionnaire (AHQ) with county data from the Census Bureau’s
American Community Survey (ACS). AHQ is collected by Illinois Health Facilities and Services Review
Board from 2009 to 2015. The AHQ provides data on all hospitals operating in Illinois, including hospital
characteristics, financial information, ownership, specialty, and financial audit status. Our analytic sample
includes all general hospitals with audited financial statements for years 2009-2015. To address
concerns about hospital closures during this period, we initially restrict the sample to continuously
operating (in every year) hospitals for 2009-2015. Our sample includes 733 observations of 105
hospitals over the 7-year period. 10
Our main outcome of interest is levels of charity care provided. While there are many potential
measures of charity care provision, we rely on the two measures discussed most frequently in the existing
literature: (1) percentage of patients receiving charity care, and (2) percentage of health services spent
on charity care. Our main independent variable is a binary interaction variable that takes a value of 1 for
10 2 observations are excluded out of 735 total hospital-year observations due to missing outcome data.
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nonprofit hospitals in the post-policy period (2012-2015) and 0 otherwise. “Hospital and financial
characteristics” is a vector of variables that reflect the number of patients, number of beds, and natural
logarithm of revenue (in 2015 dollars using the consumer price index, CPI). Number of patients includes
total number of people receiving inpatient and outpatient care from the hospital. Number of beds
measures the authorized bed capacity of each hospital as licensed by Illinois’ Department of Public
Health. We use total revenues earned from inpatient and outpatient care to capture hospital size and
financial productivity, taking the natural logarithm to address skewness of earnings data.
The ACS includes information on county socio-demographic characteristics, which are important
considerations for hospitals deciding on the provision of charity care (Hsieh et al. 2010). “County
characteristics” is a vector of variables including population, income, gender, age group, race and
ethnicity, foreign-born population, English-speaking ability, education, poverty, and unemployment.
Population is the number of residents in the county. Income captures county per capita income. Gender
captures share female. Age group captures share of population that are children (under 18) and senior
citizens (over 65). Race is a vector of variables that reflect the share who are white, black, and other
races. Ethnicity includes the share of the county population that is Hispanic. Foreign-born population
reflects the share of county residents born outside the U.S. English-speaking ability is the share of the
population who speak English “less than very well”. Education is a vector of variables that reflect
population educational attainment (share less than high school, high school, some college, bachelors, and
graduate). We measure poverty as the county poverty rate and unemployment as the unemployment
rate.

10

Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for hospital characteristics and the county characteristics faced by
general hospitals in 2009. Nonprofit hospitals are larger than the for-profit and government hospitals,
earning more revenue and serving more patients. Nonprofits are also the most common ownership type
among general hospitals (80 out of 105 in the sample). There are more general government hospitals
than for-profits, but the government hospitals in Illinois are smaller, on average. Nonprofit hospitals
provide greater levels of charity care, on average, spending a higher share on charity care and serving a
higher share of charity care patients.
[Table 1]
Hospitals in our analytic sample locate in 58 counties, which comprises over half of all Illinois
counties (102 total). For-profit hospitals operate in the largest counties, followed by nonprofit and then
government hospitals. For-profit hospitals operate in counties with greater black and Hispanic
populations, higher shares who speak English less than very well, and high levels of educational
attainment and per capita income.
We exclude hospitals with specializations (i.e. children’s specialty, psychiatric, and
rehabilitation) and those with unaudited financial statements. These hospitals are generally, large and
provide high levels of charity care. The hospitals in our analytic sample locate in counties with smaller
populations and lower per capita income, as compared to excluded hospitals. Our sample’s counties are
whiter and less Hispanic.

Empirical strategy
We use a variety of panel data methods to estimate the effect of Illinois’ MCCP law on charity care
provided. First, we estimate differences across sectors before the MCCP law and then compare the
11

difference in those differences over time. 11 That is, we compare the effects of the MCCP law on hospitals
subject to its requirements (nonprofits) and not subject to requirements (public and for-profits),
exploiting the discrete change in charitable care requirements for nonprofit hospitals (“setting the bar”).
We control for hospital characteristics, county demographics, and year and county (or hospital) fixed
effects. As an important contribution, we differentiate between responses for hospitals required to
maintain minimal charitable spending (nonprofits) and those that are not (for-profit and government).
Further, we bring in a rich set of county control covariates to characterize the demographic, fiscal,
and geographic environment of hospitals. County controls are preferred to hospital demographic
controls, because the characteristics of patients a hospital serves may be endogenous – a hospital that
provides charity care may lead to the hospital serving more poor patients or patients with certain racial
backgrounds (see, for example, Norton and Staiger 1994).
Our empirical strategy relies on a key identifying assumption: that the MCCP law targeting
nonprofit hospitals does not affect government or for-profit hospitals’ charity care. While previous
research finds a link between hospital ownership type and the level of charity care provided (Schneider
2007; Ferris and Graddy 1999), this could be confounded by other differences across the hospitals.
Instead, we focus on the changes in charity care that occur contemporaneously with the MCCP law,
holding other hospital and county characteristics constant. 12 We leverage that identifying assumption to
better test the effectiveness of these laws.

Existing studies that examined the charity care are limited because they cannot adequately control for other differences
between nonprofit, for-profit, and government hospitals. For example, ownership of hospitals vary by specialty, location, size,
history of incorporation and expansion, debt holdings, annual profitability, among many others. That is, previous work on the
extent to which nonprofit hospitals “earn” their tax exemption is largely descriptive research and potentially confounded by
omitted variables. In particular, previous research suffers from “admiring the problem”, instead of proposing ways in which to
increase the provision of charity care in hospitals. We address this issue by including all types of hospital ownership in this
paper.
12 For-profit hospitals are eligible for an income tax credit equal to the lesser of real property taxes paid during the tax year or
the cost of free and discounted services provided [Section 35 ILCS 5/223(a), Illinois Income Tax Act, 2012].
11
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First, we begin with a model of the relationship between hospital ownership and charity care
provision prior to the MCCP law (2009-2011), controlling for a variety of hospital, county, patient, and
period characteristics:
(1) 𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑋𝑋 ′ ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝛽𝛽3 + 𝐶𝐶 ′ ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝛽𝛽4 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

where ℎ indexes hospital, 𝑐𝑐 indexes county, and 𝑡𝑡 indexes year; 𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is a vector of two outcomes that

capture the rate of charity care provided by hospital h in year t, measured as either: (1) charity care
patients as share of all patients, or (2) charity care spending as a share of revenue plus charity care
spending; 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 takes a value of 1 for a nonprofit hospital and 0 otherwise; 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 takes a value of 1 for

a for-profit hospital and 0 otherwise; government hospitals serve as the reference category; 𝑋𝑋 ′ ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is a
vector of hospital and financial characteristics including number of patients, number of beds, and natural
the logarithm of revenue (in 2015 dollars using the consumer price index, CPI); 𝐶𝐶 ′ ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is a vector of county
characteristics including population, per capita income, and share by age group (under 18 and over 65),

gender, race and ethnicity, foreign-born population, English-speaking ability, educational attainment,
poverty status, and unemployed; 13 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 is a year fixed effect; and 𝜀𝜀ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is an error term. In alternative
models, we add county fixed effects to control for unobserved differences across counties. Standard

errors are clustered at the hospital level. 𝛽𝛽1 (𝛽𝛽2) capture the pre-policy difference in the provision of
charity care between government hospitals and nonprofit (for-profit) hospitals, holding other factors of
the hospital including size, location, demographics, and revenues constant.

In alternative specifications, we include the demographic characteristics of patients, including race and ethnicity, in lieu of
county demographic characteristics. Results are consistent, which suggests our findings are robust to alternative measures of
the populations served. Results available upon request of authors.

13

13

We examine the effect of MCCP, estimating the extent to which MCCP increases (or decreases)
nonprofit hospitals’ charity care provision. Our preferred models include controls for hospital and county
characteristics in addition to county fixed effects.
(2) 𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑋𝑋 ′ ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝛽𝛽4 + 𝐶𝐶 ′ ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝛽𝛽5 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

where all variables are as previously defined, and 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is a binary interaction variable that

captures nonprofit hospitals in the post-policy period (2012-2015). 14 The coefficient of interest, 𝛽𝛽2 on

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 , captures the MCCP effect on nonprofit hospitals’ charity care provision. Preferred
models include year fixed-effects and county fixed-effects, 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 , to control for unobserved differences

across counties. We also test robustness to pooled analyses and include hospital fixed effects in lieu of
county fixed effects. 15 Again, standard errors clustered at hospital level. Our key coefficient is 𝛽𝛽2, which
captures the effect of the MCCP law on hospitals’ charity care provision. These are our core analyses,
which rely on more plausible identifying assumptions than previous studies. We estimate the first
difference as differences in charity care provided across hospital ownership type (nonprofit, for-profit,
government), but focus our interpretation on the difference in those differences that follow the MCCP
law. That is, our key assumption is that the difference between ownership sectors would have remained
consistent over time if not for the policy.
We then test our identifying assumptions in three ways. First, we estimate the linear trend
between nonprofit hospitals and charity care in the three years prior to the MCCP law as a test of the
parallel trends assumption. That is, we test whether the relationship between ownership and charity care
is constant prior to the policy change. Second, we run a placebo test, setting a fake post-policy variable

14 We exclude the variable 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡

𝑡𝑡 , because it is collinear with year fixed effects.
County fixed effects are collinear with hospital fixed effects and are excluded in hospital fixed effects models. Hospitals
rarely change ownership type, so coefficients on nonprofit and for-profit are nearly, but not perfectly, collinear with hospital
fixed effects in these models.
15
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equal to 1 in the year prior to MCCP adoption. For both the first and the second test, null results suggest
that the identifying assumptions are valid. Third, we conduct an event study analysis. We test the
relationship between ownership type and charity care in every year to determine whether changes in that
relationship coincide with the MCCP law. Our non-parametric event study specifications also assess the
parallel trends assumption. We add annual interactions between nonprofit and year, centered on the year
of MCCP adoption.
(3) 𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡′ ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑋𝑋 ′ ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝛽𝛽4 + 𝐶𝐶 ′ ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝛽𝛽5 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

where all variables are as previously defined, and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 is a vector of indicators reflecting the
number of years before and after MCCP adoption. 16 𝛽𝛽2 captures differences in the relationship between

nonprofit hospitals’ charity care over time, where the secular trend is estimated using for-profit and
government hospitals. Coefficients that are indistinguishable from 0 before the policy provide evidence
that the parallel trends assumption is credible. Estimates that are statically significant post-policy indicate
that the MCCP law changes charity care provided by nonprofit hospitals. The year before the policy –
2011 – serves as the reference year. Again, standard errors are clustered at the hospital level.
Finally, we explore potential heterogeneity based on levels of charity care provided before the
MCCP law. We split nonprofit hospitals into three terciles – the top, middle, and bottom third of
nonprofit hospitals– based on average share of revenues spent on charity care in the pre-study period
(from 2006 to 2008).17 We fix nonprofit hospitals to their tercile group and estimate charity care over
time to assess whether the impact of MCCP varies by the levels of charity care provided before Illinois
16 That is, for example, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀

1 = 1 in 2013 and 0 in any other year, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀−1 = 1 in 2011 and 0 in any other year, etc.
We think that using the average charity care during the pre-study period (from 2006 to 2008) best reflects hospitals’
“propensity” to provide charity care in the absence of MCCP. Using observations in sample to construct terciles may suffer
from regression to the mean, such that differences across hospitals narrow simply due to mechanical statistical artifacts rather
than changing underlying behavior. Alternatively, we use data in the first year of the panel (2009) to assign nonprofit hospitals
to the three terciles based on charity care provided in the first observation year – the results are similar, but, again, may reflect
regression to the means rather than effects of MCCP.
17
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“set the bar.” The “top tercile” includes nonprofit hospitals in the top third of charity care provision
(above 1.82% of health services spent on charity care) and the “bottom tercile” are those at the bottom
(below 1.29%). “Middle tercile” are nonprofit hospitals providing charity care in any amount between
the top and bottom (above 1.29% and below 1.82% of health services spent on charity care).
Why do we suspect responses may vary? In particular, nonprofit hospitals at the bottom of the
charity care distribution may need to increase charity care just to meet the new benchmark levels.
Alternatively, hospitals at the top of the charity care distribution may not need to increase their charity
care. Instead, perhaps a formalized “bar” may enable these hospitals to decrease charity care provision
without fear of penalty. Grouping by charity care terciles in the estimation model allows us to expand
upon results from models 2 and 3, differentiating between nonprofit hospitals that provide high and low
levels of charity care relative to their peers in the years before MCCP.

Analysis and results
Our OLS results are shown in Table 2, showing the relationship between ownership type and charity care
before MCCP. Descriptively, nonprofit hospitals provide more charity care than government hospitals,
on average. Column 3 of Table 2, which includes controls for county demographic and hospital
characteristics, suggests that nonprofit hospitals serve 1.578 percentage points greater share of patients
with charity care than do government hospitals. Column 7 suggests that nonprofits spend 1.014
percentage points more of their revenues on charity care than do government hospitals. 18 This
relationship is, however, entirely driven by differences in the locations of nonprofit and government
hospitals. Nonprofit hospitals that are located in the same counties as government hospitals serve about

18 Results from columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, which control for substantially fewer potential confounders, are consistent in direction

and magnitudes.
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the same share of charity care patients (0.005 percentage points less) and actually spend somewhat less
(0.980 percentage points) of their hospital revenues on charity care patients, as shown in columns 4 and
8, respectively. For example, nonprofit has positive and significant coefficients in columns 5 to 7,
showing results from models that do not include county fixed effects. Conversely, nonprofit has a
negative, significant coefficient in column 8 (a model that includes county fixed effects). That is,
nonprofit hospitals that operate in the same county as government hospitals provide less charity care
than their counterpart, on average.
[Table 2]
For-profit hospitals provide less charity care than nonprofits to an even greater degree. Column
3 of Table 2, shows that nonprofit hospitals serve 3.064 percentage points greater share of patients with
charity care than do for-profit hospitals. Column 7 suggests that nonprofits spend 2.162 percentage
points more of their revenues on charity care than do for-profit hospitals. 19 Unlike the relationship with
government hospitals, however, this relationship does not appear to be driven by differences in the
locations of hospitals. Nonprofit hospitals that are located in the same counties as for-profit hospitals
serve a greater share of charity care patients (3.719 percentage points; though this is imprecisely
estimated) and spend more of their hospital revenues on charity care patients (2.519 percentage points),
as shown in columns 4 and 8, respectively.
Table 3 shows results of our difference-in-differences models, which all indicate that the policy
had little or no effect on average charity care provision in nonprofit hospitals. All results show that the
interaction between nonprofit hospital and treatment (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) is small and insignificant. Columns 1
through 5 indicate that there is no relationship between the MCCP policy and the share of patients

19 Results from columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, which control for substantially fewer potential confounders, are consistent in direction

and largely consistent in magnitudes (though perhaps becoming a little stronger in preferred models).
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receiving charity care in nonprofit hospitals. Columns 6 through 10 indicate that there is no relationship
between the MCCP policy and the ratio of revenues spent on charity care in nonprofit hospitals. The
result is robust to inclusion of additional controls, county fixed effects and hospital fixed effects. Taken
together, these results indicate that the policy was unsuccessful, on average, because the MCCP law did
not increase charity care provided in nonprofits.
[Table 3]
We test the key model assumptions in Table 4. Columns 1, 2, 6, and 7 show results of tests of the
parallel trends assumptions, finding no significant trend prior to policy implementation in 2012 (point
estimates, if they are to be believed, despite insignificance, suggest a small increase in charity care over
time). Columns 3 to 5 and Columns 8 to 10 show tests of the assumption that there are no effects prior
to treatment, showing statistically insignificant positive coefficients if we assign “treatment” to the year
before MCCP.
[Table 4]
We then turn to event study results to further test the parallel trends assumption and assess the
extent to which impacts change over time. The results are shown graphically in Figure 1 panels A and B,
with point estimates displayed as dots and 95% confidence intervals shown as lines (coefficients shown
in tabular form are displayed in Appendix 2). The results provide little evidence of changes in the
relationship between nonprofit and charity care prior to the MCCP law. The only statistically significant
point estimate indicates that nonprofit hospitals spent relatively less on charity care in 2009 than they
do in the year just prior to the policy change (panel B, year 2009). Moreover, the results provide no
evidence that charity care increases in nonprofits concurrently with or after adoption of the MCCP law.
That is, there is no evidence that the MCCP law worked, on average. In fact, the trends for both charity
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care outcomes are negative (but statistically insignificant) after 2013. Like the difference-in-differences
estimates, these results suggest that, if anything, the MCCP law decreased average charity care provided
by nonprofits. This finding is somewhat stronger, but still only suggestive, in the event studies.
[Figure 1 Panel A and B]
Next, we break apart the nonprofit effect by how much charity care the hospitals provided
before the sample period. Here, we calculate charity care spending as a share of revenues for nonprofit
hospitals between years 2006 and 2008. Then, we rank nonprofit hospitals by charity care provided,
breaking them into terciles based on whether they rank in the top third, middle third, or bottom third of
charity care spending. By construction, those in the top third provide more charity care prior to the policy,
but the persistence of this effect across model specifications (and outcome variables) is notable. If charity
care provision each year were “random” then these estimates would be statistically indistinguishable
because the terciles are constructed out of the sample. Instead, the ordinal nature of the coefficients for
NP_top, NP_middle, and NP_bottom suggest that some nonprofit hospitals have a greater “innate”
proclivity for charity care than others, even among general hospitals and holding revenues, size, and
county characteristics constant.
In terms of the impact of MCCP, we observe substantial heterogeneity (especially for the
spending outcome). The point estimates indicate that hospitals in the top tercile prior to 2009 actually
decrease charity care spending in response to MCCP (though all estimates are statistically insignificant).
Conversely, nonprofit hospitals in the bottom tercile increase charity care, and the result is statistically
significant for charity care spending (for share of patients receiving charity care, the result is consistent,
but statistically insignificant). As a result of these two trends, the gap between the top and bottom
nonprofit hospitals narrows substantially after adoption of the MCCP policy. In 2009, there is a 2.9
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percentage point gap in share of patients receiving charity care between the top and bottom terciles of
nonprofit hospitals. By 2015 that gap is less than 1.3 percentage points. Similarly, the gap in the share of
revenues spent on charity care falls from over 2.2 percentage points to 1.2. Narrowing differences
between nonprofit hospitals that provide charity care well above the bar and nonprofit hospitals that
provide charity care well below the bar is one of our most persistent results. Nonprofit hospitals in the
middle of the distribution do not change charity care spending very much in either direction. We further
calculate the impact of MCCP on the gaps between the terciles. For all comparisons, estimates indicate
that MCCP decreased the gap between hospitals predisposed to provide more charity care and those
predisposed to provide less.
[Table 5]
Finally, we return to an event study framework to better understand timing. Results, shown
graphically in Figure 2 panels A and B (in tabular form in Appendix 3), suggest that the gap between high
and low charity care non-profits does not narrow in the period before MCCP, but does substantially after.
[Figure 2 Panel A and B]
Beginning with Panel A, in 2009, the gap between the top tercile and the bottom tercile is 2.9 percentage
points and remains about the same until 2011 (2.6 percentage points). Following the MCCP law,
however, the gap narrows, both by the intended effect of those at the bottom increasing charity care and
by those at the top decreasing. By 2015, the gap between top and bottom is only 1.3 percentage
points 20. Hospitals in the middle tercile respond like an average of the two, perhaps more closely
resembling the top tercile.

20 The event studies also suggests that hospitals in the bottom tercile respond quickly to the policy, increasing charity care in

the first two years following implementation (2012 and 2013) and keeping charity care near the new levels thereafter.
Conversely, the top tercile initially remains the same or even increases charity care in 2012 and 2013, but then begins a steep
decline, perhaps once the hospitals notice that the bar set is not binding for them.
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Panel B of Figure 2 shows a similar pattern. All nonprofit hospitals slowly increase charity care
relative to government and for-profit hospitals in the pre-period (though this trend is very similar across
the nonprofit sector and statistically insignificant for all three terciles). Then, nonprofit hospitals in the
bottom tercile increase charity care further in 2012 and 2013, followed by leveling off of the policy
impact. Conversely, the top and middle terciles of nonprofits increase charity care spending at a more
moderate pace in 2012 and 2013, followed by steep declines in 2014 and 2015. Taken together, the
charity care spending gap in nonprofit hospitals falls from 2.2 percentage points in 2009 to just 1.2
percentage points in 2015.

Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the effectiveness of MCCP laws to shed light on the effectiveness of policies
that set standards for minimal service delivery to hold nonprofit hospitals accountable for provision of
health services to communities. We find no evidence that the MCCP law increased the average charity
care provided by nonprofit hospitals. Instead, we find substantial evidence that the MCCP law closed
gaps in charity care provision within the nonprofit sector: it increased charity care provided among
nonprofit hospitals offering low levels prior to the policy, and decreased it in nonprofit hospitals who
offer high levels of charity care at baseline. In ancillary analyses, we reaffirm previous research, finding
nonprofit (and public) hospitals provide more charity care than for-profit hospitals in the absence of
MCCP (consistent with Arrington and Haddock 1990 and Clement et al. 2002). Results are robust to
alternative specifications and samples, including models with and without county (or hospital) fixed
effects, a panel with all Illinois hospitals (not just general hospitals with audited financial statements), and
a longer panel (2006–2015, using hospital demographic controls in lieu of county characteristics),
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among many others. Tests of the parallel trends assumption and a placebo test using a false policy start
date suggest the inferences we draw from the difference-in-differences models are warranted.
There are important limitations to our analysis. We were not able to take into account other
factors such as Medicaid and Medicare that might affect charity care provision. Increases in Medicare
and Medicaid coverage and fees for service payments may alleviate the burden of charity care required
from the hospitals. For example, there is evidence to suggest that recent policy efforts to increase access
to Medicaid coverage could result in reducing levels of uncompensated care (Hsieh et al. 2010). As
another example, research shows that hospitals experiencing price pressures from Medicare and
Medicaid (Mann et al. 1995) or managed care firms (Gruber 1994) decrease their provision of charity
care relative to other hospitals. Given increased competitive pressures leads to profit-seeking behaviors
and reduced charity care among hospitals, we cannot speak to whether hospitals in the state or individual
counties are providing sufficient charity care in later years (Gruber 1994; Keeler, Melnick and Zwanziger
1999; Sloan 2000).
Furthermore, we use charity care data reported through the AHQ and not MCCP forms returned
by hospitals to the State each year. On the one hand, this serves as a disadvantage, because our charity
care metric might miss important community benefit activities. On the other hand, this enables us to
establish a secular charity care trend using data on all types of hospitals (government, for-profit,
nonprofit), which is not available on MCCP forms or in earlier studies.
Despite these limitations, this paper provides important empirical evidence on the efficacy of
recent accountability policies that set target benchmarks for nonprofit hospitals. One thing for
policymakers to consider is why the MCCP law does not appear to work. Here, policy context is quite
relevant. Prior to the MCCP law in Illinois, the charity care requirements for nonprofit hospitals were
aspirational and ambiguous. Nonprofit hospitals were expected to provide charity care and other
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community benefits to the best of their ability (Provena Covenant Med. Cent. v. Dep. Rev. 236 III. 2d
368 (2010)). The precise way the State decided to hold nonprofit hospitals accountable for their “best”
or their “ability” was unclear. Moreover, threats of removal of tax exemption status for hospitals (such as
Provena and others) served as a warning to hospitals to take actions demonstrating their commitment to
meet this aspiration, even if the standards were not clearly or uniformly applied.
In contrast, the MCCP law set a low accountability benchmark that was transparent. While
nonprofit hospitals were required to provide a certain level of charity care relative to their earnings and
foregone property tax burden, most of the hospitals were already providing greater levels of charity care
than required. In fact, a handful provided substantially more. By defining the accountability benchmark
and clarifying expectations, the policy may have unintentionally undermined the incentives for hospitals
already exceeding the (previously tacit) expectations for nonprofits.
We find that explicit quantitative standards can result in unintended consequences when an
accountability policy sets low benchmarks. While hospitals in the bottom tercile of charity care prior to
the sample period increase charity care provided, those at the top seem to decrease it (though the results
are statistically insignificant). As a result of these two trends, the gap between the top and bottom
nonprofit hospitals narrows substantially after adoption of the MCCP policy. In 2009, there is a 2.9
percentage point gap in share of patients receiving charity care between the top and bottom terciles of
nonprofit hospitals. By 2015 that gap is less than 1.3 percentage points. Similarly, the gap in the share of
revenues spent on charity care falls from over 2.2 percentage points to 1.2. Narrowing of the differences
between “generous” and “ungenerous” nonprofit hospitals with respect to charity care provided was one
of our most persistent results.
Our results contribute to previous work that also finds that MCCP laws do not create sufficient
incentives for most nonprofit hospitals to provide greater community benefits (Kennedy et al. 2010). In
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part, it seems this is because most nonprofits are already clearing the accountability benchmarks. Our
results, in fact, suggest that Kennedy and colleagues (2010) may actually overestimate the intended
effects of MCCP laws in Texas, because the comparison group included hospitals that provide high levels
of charity care prior to MCCP provisions – a group we find decreasing charity care over time relative to
other hospitals unaffected by the law (government and for-profits). The fact that Kennedy and
colleagues (2010) still find null effects provides further evidence that MCCP laws may not have the
consequences policymakers intend. These findings, taken together, help address a gap in the literature by
providing insights on the ongoing debate on effectiveness of charity care requirements. Our results
provide insights on the potential consequences – both intended and unintended – of expanding the
community benefit obligations of tax-exempt hospitals. Our results also offer useful insight into the
effectiveness of similar legislation.
Importantly then, while the MCCP law does not affect average charity care provision in nonprofit
hospitals, the heterogeneity in effects may have substantial distributional consequences. For example,
MCCP laws may affect equity because only a few nonprofit hospitals ramp up charity care (while others
seem to decrease it), and poor people living near those hospitals may benefit. Nonprofit hospitals that
provide low levels of charity care before MCCP disproportionately locate in smaller counties with higher
proportions of older, native-born, white, non-Hispanic residents. The poor residents of these counties
may benefit from the MCCP policy. Conversely, nonprofit hospitals that provide high levels of charity
care at baseline are disproportionately located in large counties, especially Cook County (Chicago).
These hospitals, as a result, serve a more racially and ethnically diverse population (evidenced by county
and patient characteristics). A higher share of their county residents have very little education (less than
high school) or very high levels of education (bachelor or graduate). The poor residents of these counties
seem to be harmed by the MCCP law due to reductions in charity care provided by their nonprofit
24

hospitals. Which geographic areas have greater unmet need and/or demand for charity care is an
important efficiency and equity concern that is beyond the scope of this current work. Future research
should further unpack the differences in the populations served by various nonprofit hospitals to shed
light on the consequences of MCCP laws for hospital finances and viability as well as quality of patient
care and their health outcomes.
This paper provides useful insight into the potential consequences – both intended and
unintended – of further expansions of community benefit requirements for tax-exempt hospitals and
holding nonprofit hospitals accountable for them. In the era of the ACA, states and the federal
government seek to hold hospitals accountable for their provision of community health benefits and,
specifically, charity care. Laws aimed at increasing charity care provided by hospitals are increasingly
common in an attempt to hold nonprofit hospitals more accountable for fulfilling their social mission and
addressing broader community health needs. Our findings, taken together, show that Illinois’ MCCP law
was ineffective if the goal was increasing charity care overall, suggesting that setting low accountability
benchmarks will not increase community benefits. Our results, thus, pour cold water on further expansion
of MCCP policies to serve this purpose. Still, we also find that certain hospitals that otherwise provide
particularly low levels of charity care respond positively to the MCCP accountability policy.
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Tables
Table 1. Hospital and County Characteristics, Hospitals Continuously Operating 2009-2015, Characteristics in 2009
(1)

(2)
Excluded
Sample

Analytic Sample
Full Sample

NP

FP

GOV

168,581,705
134,330
181
1.92
2.13
105

201,427,089
158,802
214
2.14
2.43
82

98,741,867
58,087
107
1.23
1.61
6

34,800,385
43,195
50
1.10
0.87
17

191,570,807
114,341
222
1.87
3.88
40

1,314,695
28,156

1,475,299
28,667

2,766,476
31,246

27,624
24,601

2,797,202
30,957

Female (%)

50.67

50.78

50.55

50.15

50.80

Age under 18 (%)
Age over 65(%)

23.76
14.07

24.02
13.67

24.52
11.63

22.28
16.85

24.35
12.54

White (%)
Black (%)
Other (%)

80.99
10.35
8.65

78.93
11.71
9.35

70.60
14.83
14.53

94.61
2.21
3.18

69.61
16.19
14.19

Hispanic (%)

9.03

9.79

16.07

2.88

14.70

Born Abroad (%)

0.81

0.86

1.15

0.46

1.16

Speak English Less than “very well” (%)

5.70

6.25

10.47

1.36

9.88

Hospital
Mean Hospital Revenue ($)
Mean Patients
Mean Bed Number
Share Spent on Charity Care (%)
Share Patients receiving Charity Care (%)
Number of Hospitals
County
Population
Per capita Income ($)
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Table 1. Hospital and County Characteristics, Hospitals Continuously Operating 2009-2015, Characteristics in 2009
(Continued)
(1)

(2)
Excluded
Sample

Analytic Sample
Full Sample

NP

FP

GOV

Less High School (%)
High School (%)
Some College (%)
Bachelor (%)
Graduate (%)

14.25
32.26
29.44
15.21
8.84

14.00
31.35
29.37
15.96
9.32

15.27
28.23
26.60
18.08
11.82

15.07
38.07
30.82
10.56
5.47

15.14
27.93
27.45
18.16
11.33

Below 100 percent Poverty Level (%)
100 to 149 percent Poverty Level (%)
At or above 149 percent Poverty Level (%)

13.56
8.62
77.83

13.62
8.51
77.88

14.15
8.47
77.38

13.09
9.18
77.73

13.50
8.39
78.11

Unemployment (%)

7.84

7.95

8.43

7.11

8.10

58

42

4

15

17

Number of Counties

Note: Analytic sample includes observations of general hospitals in years with audited financial statements and information on charity care provisions. All dollars are reported
in 2015 dollars using urban CPI. There are 4 counties (Cook, Bureau, Lake, Randolph) with two types of hospital ownership type, and hospitals only in Cook counties
consistently exist across the years. Three hospitals changed ownership type (one changed FP to NP, one from GOV to NP, one from GOV to NP and back) within our analytic
sample. We have three hospitals (four observations) with missing ownership type information within our analytic sample. For each of the hospital with missing ownership type,
we used other years’ ownership information to assign ownership type. We remove 1 hospital with implausibly large charity care provisions. Results are not sensitive to
excluding those observations all together.
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Table 2. Regression Results, Relationship Between Ownership Type and Charity Care Provision, Pre-Policy, 2009-2011
Variables
NP
FP

Year FE
County Controls
Hospital Controls
County FE
NP - FP
Counties
Hospitals
Observations
R-squared

Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
2.066***
1.294***
1.578***
-0.005
(0.407)
(0.384)
(0.487)
(0.370)
0.354
-0.954
-1.486
-3.724
(0.746)
(1.022)
(1.339)
(2.572)

Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
1.354***
0.947***
1.014***
-0.980***
(0.236)
(0.224)
(0.247)
(0.129)
-0.446
-0.964*
-1.148*
-3.499***
(0.462)
(0.550)
(0.614)
(1.085)

YES
NO
NO
NO

YES
YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
NO
NO
NO

YES
YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
YES
YES

1.712**
58
105
315
0.067

2.248**
58
105
315
0.155

3.064**
58
105
315
0.183

3.719
58
105
315
0.286

1.800***
58
105
315
0.156

1.911***
58
105
315
0.233

2.162***
58
105
315
0.244

2.519**
58
105
315
0.380

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered by hospitals in parentheses. Continuously operating general hospitals (from 2009-2015). Sample includes
observations in years with audited financial statements and information on charity care provided. County controls in all models include population, share of
population age under 18 & age over 65, share of population born abroad, gender (male is omitted category), race (White is omitted category), Hispanic,
foreign-born population, English-speaking ability, educational attainment (less than high school is omitted category), poverty status (below 100 percent of
the poverty level is omitted category), unemployment rate, per capita income (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). Hospital controls in all models
include authorized bed number and natural log of revenue (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). NP-FP indicates point estimates using a postestimation F-statistic. Reference group = government hospitals. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Table 3. Regression Results, Impact of Minimum Charity Care Law, Difference-in-Differences Model, 2009-2015
Variables
NPPost
NP
FP

Year FE
County Controls
Hospital Controls
County FE
Hospital FE
Counties
Hospitals
Observations
R-squared

Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
0.187
0.087
0.062 0.0532 -0.081
(0.311) (0.320) (0.319) (0.342) (0.316)
1.976*** 1.006*** 1.213*** -0.212 0.321
(0.405) (0.353) (0.402) (0.270) (0.280)
-0.024 -1.422 -1.860 -4.600** -0.973*
(0.664) (1.009) (1.225) (2.016) (0.525)

Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
0.167
0.090
0.087
0.287
0.167
(0.160) (0.174) (0.173) (0.191) (0.163)
1.326*** 0.938*** 0.981*** -0.439
1.015
(0.232) (0.229) (0.239) (0.454) (1.295)
-0.565 -1.137** -1.288** -2.943*** 0.363
(0.343) (0.459) (0.527) (0.896) (1.312)

YES
NO
NO
NO
NO

YES
YES
NO
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
YES

YES
NO
NO
NO
NO

YES
YES
NO
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
YES

58
105
733
0.083

58
105
733
0.195

58
105
733
0.219

58
105
733
0.311

58
105
733
0.798

58
105
733
0.191

58
105
733
0.251

58
105
733
0.261

58
105
733
0.376

58
105
733
0.792

Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by hospitals in parentheses. Continuously operating general hospitals (from 2009-2015). Sample includes
observations in years with audited financial statements and information on charity care provided. County controls in all models include population, share of
population age under 18 & age over 65, share of population born abroad, gender (male is omitted category), race (White is omitted category), Hispanic,
foreign-born population, English-speaking ability, educational attainment (less than high school is omitted category), poverty status (below 100 percent of
the poverty level is omitted category), unemployment rate, per capita income (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). Hospital controls in all models
include authorized bed number and natural log of revenue (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). Reference group = government hospitals. * p<0.1 **
p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Table 4. Test of Parallel Trend Assumption (Pre-Policy, 2009-2011) and Placebo Test (Impact Year Before Policy), 2009-2015
Variables
NPPretrend
NPfakePost
NPPost
NP
FP

Year FE
County Controls
Hospital Controls
County FE
Hospital FE
Counties
Hospitals
Observations
R-squared

Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
0.394 0.347
0.296*
0.307
(0.259) (0.334)
(0.154) (0.195)
0.423 0.501
0.324
0.351
0.426* 0.294
(0.393) (0.430) (0.352)
(0.233) (0.247) (0.227)
-0.220 -0.271 -0.288
-0.147
0.012
-0.020
(0.322) (0.346) (0.363)
(0.230) (0.230) (0.233)
2.367*** 0.689 1.074** -0.385 0.207 1.608*** -0.365 0.866*** -0.586
0.911
(0.696) (0.800) (0.456) (0.332) (0.304) (0.405) (0.443) (0.256) (0.473) (1.305)
-1.497 -3.759 -1.860 -4.607** -1.076** -1.156* -3.529*** -1.288** -2.949*** 0.270
(1.338) (2.564) (1.226) (2.016) (0.528) (0.610) (1.060) (0.528) (0.895) (1.319)
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
YES

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
YES

58
105
315
0.185

58
105
315
0.287

58
105
733
0.219

58
105
733
0.311

58
105
733
0.799

58
105
315
0.247

58
105
315
0.383

58
105
733
0.262

58
105
733
0.377

58
105
733
0.792

Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by hospitals in parentheses. Continuously operating general hospitals (from 2009-2015). Sample includes observations in years
with audited financial statements and information on charity care provided. County controls in all models include population, share of population age under 18 & age over 65,
share of population born abroad, gender (male is omitted category), race (White is omitted category), Hispanic, foreign-born population, English-speaking ability, educational
attainment (less than high school is omitted category), poverty status (below 100 percent of the poverty level is omitted category), unemployment rate, per capita income
(all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). Hospital controls in all models include authorized bed number and natural log of revenue (all reported in 2015 dollars using
urban CPI). Reference group = government hospitals. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Table 5. Heterogeneity of Impacts by Baseline Charity Care Provisions
Variables
Post: NP*Top
NP*Middle
NP*Bottom
NP*Top
NP*Middle
NP*Bottom
FP

Year FE
County Controls
Hospital Controls
County FE
Hospital FE

Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.186 -0.130 -0.162 -0.257 -0.228
(0.430) (0.424) (0.421) (0.434) (0.449)
0.093
0.094
0.092 -0.104 -0.068
(0.399) (0.439) (0.440) (0.455) (0.458)
0.390
0.392
0.391 0.197 0.201
(0.355) (0.386) (0.388) (0.369) (0.380)
3.355*** 2.413*** 2.711*** 3.134**
(0.720) (0.680) (0.691) (1.251)
1.673** 1.011
1.215 0.527
(0.711) (0.675) (0.758) (1.344)
0.802** 0.042
0.156 -0.459
(0.367) (0.541) (0.540) (0.289)
1.299
0.036 -0.429 -0.930
(1.520) (1.554) (1.656) (2.832)
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO

Post: NP*Top – NP*Middle
-0.279
NP*Top – NP*Bottom -0.576

YES
YES
NO
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO

-0.224
-0.522

-0.254
-0.553

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
YES

Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
-0.131
-0.106
-0.092
-0.015 -0.012
(0.186) (0.200) (0.203) (0.204) (0.208)
-0.002
-0.022
-0.023
0.048
0.067
(0.198) (0.226) (0.226) (0.234) (0.242)
0.455*** 0.476*** 0.471*** 0.483*** 0.488***
(0.139) (0.168) (0.169) (0.160) (0.162)
2.392*** 2.142*** 2.238*** 1.393***
(0.346) (0.341) (0.344) (0.527)
1.186*** 0.940*** 0.942*** -0.744**
(0.231) (0.278) (0.287) (0.349)
0.283
0.014
0.022 -1.387***
(0.243) (0.259) (0.262) (0.0988)
0.271
-0.129
-0.307
-1.149
(0.970) (0.991) (1.003) (1.684)
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO

YES
YES
NO
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
YES

-0.153 -0.16
-0.129
-0.084
-0.069
-0.063 -0.079
-0.454 -0.429 -0.586*** -0.582*** -0.563*** -0.498** -0.500**
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Table 5. Heterogeneity of Impacts by Baseline Charity Care Provisions (Continued)
Variables

Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

NP*Middle – NP*Bottom -0.297 -0.298 -0.299 -0.301 -0.269 -0.457** -0.498** -0.494** -0.435* -0.421*
Counties
58
58
58
58
58
58
58
58
58
58
Hospitals
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
Observations
733
733
733
733
733
733
733
733
733
733
R-squared
0.133 0.223 0.248 0.349 0.799
0.300
0.337
0.356
0.484
0.794
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by hospitals in parentheses. Continuously operating general hospitals (from 2009-2015). Sample includes
observations in years with audited financial statements and information on charity care provided. County controls in all models include population, share of
population age under 18 & age over 65, share of population born abroad, gender (male is omitted category), race (White is omitted category), Hispanic,
foreign-born population, English-speaking ability, educational attainment (less than high school is omitted category), poverty status (below 100 percent of
the poverty level is omitted category), unemployment rate, per capita income (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). Hospital controls in all models
include authorized bed number and natural log of revenue (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). “NP*Top” indicates top tercile > 1.82% of health
services, “NP*Middle” indicates middle tercile 1.29% – 1.82% of health services, “NP*Bottom” indicates bottom tercile < 1.29% of health services spent on
charity care. Reference group = government hospitals. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Figures
Figure 1. Panel A. Event Study, Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care, 20092015

Figure 1. Panel B. Event Study, Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care,
2009-2015

Note: Continuously operating general hospitals (from 2009-2015). Sample includes observations in years with
audited financial statements and information on charity care provided.
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Figure 2. Panel A. Event Study Results, Heterogeneity of Impacts by Baseline Charity
Care Provisions, Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care, 2009-2015

Figure 2. Panel B. Event Study Results, Heterogeneity of Impacts by Baseline Charity
Care Provisions, Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care, 2009-2015

Note: “NP*Top” indicates top tercile > 1.82% of health services, “NP*Middle” indicates middle tercile 1.29% –
1.82% of health services, “NP*Bottom” indicates bottom tercile < 1.29% of health services spent on charity care.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Share of Hospital Ownership, Analytic Sample, 2009-2015
Ownership Ownership sub-type

NP

Church-Related
Not For Profit
Corporation
Other Not For Profit
(NP total)

Share (%)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
20.95 23.81 23.81 22.86 22.12 20.19 18.10
55.24 51.43 53.33 53.33 52.88 51.92 54.29
1.90 3.81 1.90 2.86 4.81 8.65 7.62
78.09 79.05 79.04 79.05 79.81 80.76 80.01

FP

For Profit Corporation

5.71

GOV

City
County
Township
Hospital District
Other Governmental
(GOV total)

2.86 2.86 2.86 2.86 2.88 1.92 1.90
0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95
0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95
11.43 10.48 10.48 11.43 10.58 10.58 10.48
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.95
16.19 15.24 15.24 16.19 15.38 14.42 15.23
Number of count: 733

Total

4.76

4.76

4.76

4.81

4.81

4.76

Note: We assigned hospital ownership type based on the information from the AHQ survey. The ownership type
is mutually exclusive. Three hospitals changed ownership type (one hospital changed from FP to NP, one hospital
changed from GOV to NP, one hospital changed from GOV to NP, then from NP to GOV) within our analytic
sample.

41

Appendix 2. Event Study, 2009-2015
VARIABLES
NP
. 2009
2010
2012
2013
2014
2015
Year
2009
2010
2012
2013
2014
2015
NP
FP
Year FE
County Controls
Hospital Controls
County FE
Hospital FE
Counties
Hospitals
Observations
R-squared

Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care
(1)
(2)
-0.802
(0.489)
-0.030
(0.377)
-0.008
(0.263)
0.304
(0.425)
-0.413
(0.460)
-0.805*
(0.425)

-0.641**
(0.309)
-0.050
(0.240)
0.043
(0.222)
0.385
(0.251)
-0.416
(0.320)
-0.644**
(0.255)

0.072
(0.426)
0.013
(0.269)
0.205
(0.213)
0.406
(0.397)
0.396
(0.454)
0.170
(0.478)

0.036
(0.297)
-0.144
(0.220)
0.005
(0.193)
-0.249
(0.248)
-0.030
(0.330)
-0.447
(0.292)

1.500***
(0.413)
-1.874
(1.228)

1.219***
(0.278)
-1.300**
(0.526)

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO

58
105
733
0.221

58
105
733
0.269

Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by hospitals in parentheses. Continuously operating general hospitals (from 20092015). Sample includes observations in years with audited financial statements and information on charity care provided.
County controls in all models include population, share of population age under 18 & age over 65, share of population born
abroad, gender (male is omitted category), race (White is omitted category), Hispanic, foreign-born population, Englishspeaking ability, educational attainment (less than high school is omitted category), poverty status (below 100 percent of the
poverty level is omitted category), unemployment rate, per capita income (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI).
Hospital controls in all models include authorized bed number and natural log of revenue (all reported in 2015 dollars using
urban CPI). Omitted category is nonprofit hospitals in 2011. Reference group = government hospitals. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 ***
p<0.01
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Appendix 3. Heterogeneity in Treatment by Baseline Charity Care Provisions
VARIABLES
NP_Top
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
NP_Middle
2009
2010
2012
2013
2014
2015
NP_Bottom
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Year
2009

Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care
(1)

Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care
(2)

1.269
(1.139)
1.384
(1.101)
1.376
(1.072)
1.346
(1.108)
2.209*
(1.319)
0.966
(1.113)
0.197
(1.162)

0.779*
(0.414)
0.964*
(0.528)
1.132**
(0.482)
1.077**
(0.517)
1.509***
(0.553)
0.613
(0.524)
0.255
(0.473)

-0.438
(0.428)
-0.033
(0.426)
0.048
(0.458)
0.446
(0.577)
-0.074
(0.617)
-0.703
(0.570)

-0.583**
(0.250)
-0.434
(0.318)
-0.064
(0.312)
0.215
(0.330)
-0.690*
(0.393)
-0.928**
(0.388)

-1.610*
(0.890)
-0.822
(1.108)
-1.215
(0.871)
-0.779
(0.923)
-0.689
(0.954)
-0.770
(0.960)
-1.076
(0.915)

-1.452***
(0.361)
-1.299***
(0.434)
-1.033***
(0.372)
-0.918**
(0.415)
-0.530
(0.453)
-0.753
(0.462)
-0.973**
(0.407)

-0.251
(0.373)

-0.053
(0.193)
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Appendix 3. Heterogeneity in Treatment by Baseline Charity Care Provisions
(Continued)
VARIABLES
2010
2012
2013
2014
2015

FP
NP

Year FE
County Controls
Hospital Controls
County FE
Hospital FE
Counties
Hospitals
Observations
R-squared

Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care
(1)
-0.043
(0.299)
0.034
(0.281)
0.121
(0.438)
-0.004
(0.501)
-0.117
(0.483)

Percentage of Health Services Spent of Charity Care
(2)
0.103
(0.269)
0.003
(0.191)
-0.273
(0.226)
-0.186
(0.307)
-0.589*
(0.314)

-0.430
(1.673)
1.372*
(0.790)

-0.309
(1.015)
1.285***
(0.377)

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
NO
NO

58
105
733
0.253

58
105
733
0.366

Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by hospitals in parentheses. Continuously operating general hospitals
(from 2009-2015). Sample includes observations in years with audited financial statements and information on
charity care provided. County controls in all models include population, share of population age under 18 & age
over 65, share of population born abroad, gender (male is omitted category), race (White is omitted category),
Hispanic, foreign-born population, English-speaking ability, educational attainment (less than high school is
omitted category), poverty status (below 100 percent of the poverty level is omitted category), unemployment
rate, per capita income (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). Hospital controls in all models include
authorized bed number and natural log of revenue (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). “NP*Top”
indicates top tercile > 1.82% of health services, “NP*Middle” indicates middle tercile 1.29% – 1.82% of health
services, “NP*Bottom” indicates bottom tercile < 1.29% of health services spent on charity care. Reference group
= government hospitals. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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